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Abstract
We analyse the expressiveness of the two-valued semantics of
abstract argumentation frameworks, normal logic programs
and abstract dialectical frameworks. By expressiveness we
mean the ability to encode a desired set of two-valued in-
terpretations over a given propositional signature using only
atoms from that signature. While the computational complex-
ity of the two-valued model existence problem for all these
languages is (almost) the same, we show that the languages
form a neat hierarchy with respect to their expressiveness.
Introduction
More often than not, different knowledge representation lan-
guages have conceptually similar and partially overlapping
intended application areas. What are we to do if faced with
an application and a choice of several possible knowledge
representation languages which could be used for the applic-
ation? One of the first axes along which to compare different
formalisms that comes to mind is computational complexity:
if a language is computationally too expensive when con-
sidering the problem sizes typically encountered in practice,
then this is a clear criterion for exclusion.
But what if the available language candidates have the
same computational complexity? If their expressiveness in
the computational-complexity sense of “What kinds of prob-
lems can the formalism solve?” is the same, we need a more
fine-grained notion of expressiveness. In this paper, we use
such an alternative notion and perform an exemplary study
of the relative expressiveness of several different know-
ledge representation languages: argumentation frameworks
(AFs) (Dung, 1995), normal logic programs (LPs), abstract
dialectical frameworks (ADFs) (Brewka and Woltran, 2010)
and propositional logic.
This choice of languages is largely motivated by the sim-
ilar intended application domains of argumentation frame-
works and abstract dialectical frameworks and the close re-
lation of the latter to normal logic programs. We add pro-
positional logic to have a well-known reference point. Fur-
thermore, the computational complexity of their respective
model existence problems is the same (with one exception):
• for AFs, deciding stable extension existence is NP-
complete (Dimopoulos, Nebel, and Toni, 2002);
• for LPs, deciding the existence of supported/stable mod-
els is NP-complete (Bidoit and Froidevaux, 1991; Marek
and Truszczyn´ski, 1991);
• for ADFs, deciding the existence of models is NP-
complete (Brewka et al., 2013), deciding the existence of
stable models is ΣP2 -complete for general ADFs (Brewka
et al., 2013) and NP-complete for the subclass of bipolar
ADFs (Strass and Wallner, 2014);
• the satisfiability problem of propositional logic is NP-
complete.
In view of these almost identical complexities, we use an
alternative measure of the expressiveness of a knowledge
representation language L: “Given a set of two-valued in-
terpretations, is there a knowledge base in L that has this
exact model set?” This notion lends itself straightforwardly
to compare different formalisms (Gogic et al., 1995):
Formalism L2 is at least as expressive as formalism L1
if and only if every knowledge base in L1 has an equi-
valent knowledge base in L2.
So here expressiveness is understood in terms of realisabil-
ity, “What kinds of model sets can the formalism express?”
It is easy to see that propositional logic can express any
set of two-valued interpretations. The same is easy (but less
easy) to see for logic programs under supported model se-
mantics. For logic programs under stable model semantics,
it is clear that not all model sets can be expressed, since
two different stable models are always incomparable with
respect to the subset relation. In this paper, we study such
expressiveness properties for all the mentioned formalisms
under different semantics. It will turn out that the languages
form a more or less strict expressiveness hierarchy, with AFs
at the bottom, ADFs and LPs under stable semantics higher
up and ADFs and LPs under supported model semantics at
the top together with propositional logic.
To show that a language L2 is at least as expressive as a
language L1 we will mainly use two different techniques.
In the best case, we can use a syntactic compact and faith-
ful translation from knowledge bases of L1 to those of L2.
Compact means that the translation does not change the
vocabulary, that is, does not introduce new atoms. Faith-
ful means that the translation exactly preserves the models
of the knowledge base for respective semantics of the two
languages. In the second best case, we assume given the
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knowledge base of L1 in the form of a setX of desired mod-
els and construct a semantic realisation ofX in L2, that is, a
knowledge base in L2 whose model set corresponds exactly
to X . To show that language L2 is strictly more expressive
than L1, we additionally have to present a knowledge base
K from L2 of which we prove that L1 cannot express the
model set of K.
For all methods, we can make use of several recent works
on the formalisms we study here. First of all, we [2013]
studied the syntactic intertranslatability of ADFs and LPs,
but did not look at expressiveness or realisability. The lat-
ter was recently studied for argumentation frameworks by
Dunne et al. (2014). They allow to extend the vocabulary in
order to realise a given model set, as long as the new vocab-
ulary elements are evaluated to false in all models. For sev-
eral semantics of AFs, Dunne et al. found necessary (and
sufficient) conditions for realisability. While their sufficient
conditions are not applicable to our setting, they discovered
a necessary condition for realisability with stable extension
semantics that we will make use of in this paper. There has
also been work on translating ADFs into AFs for the ADF
model and AF stable extension semantics (Brewka, Dunne,
and Woltran, 2011), however this translation introduces ad-
ditional arguments and is therefore not compact.
The gain that is achieved by our results is not only that
of increased clarity about fundamental properties of these
knowledge representation languages – What can these form-
alisms express, actually? – but has several further applica-
tions. As Dunne et al. (2014) remarked, a major application
is in constructing knowledge bases with the aim of encoding
a certain model set. As a necessary prerequisite to this, it
must be known that the intended model set is realisable in
the first place. For example, in a recent approach to revising
argumentation frameworks (Coste-Marquis et al., 2013), the
authors avoid this problem by assuming to produce a collec-
tion of AFs whose model sets in union produce the desired
model set. While the work of Dunne et al. (2014) showed
that this is indeed necessary in the case of AFs and stable ex-
tension semantics (that is, there are model sets that a single
AF just cannot express), our work shows that for ADFs un-
der the model semantics, a single knowledge base (ADF) is
always enough to realise any given model set.
Of course, the fact that the languages we study have the
same computational complexity means that there in prin-
ciple exist polynomial intertranslations for the respective de-
cision problems. But such intertranslations may involve the
introduction of new atoms. In theory, a polynomial blowup
from n atoms to nk atoms for some k is of no consequence.
In practice, it has a profound impact: the number n of atoms
directly influences the search space that any implementation
potentially has to cover. There, an increase from 2n to 2n
k
is no longer polynomial, but exponential, and accordingly
makes itself felt. Being able to realise a model set com-
pactly, without new atoms, therefore attests that a language
L has a certain basic kind of efficiency property, in the sense
that the L-realisation of a model set does not unnecessarily
enlarge the search space of algorithms operating on it.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first define the notion
of expressiveness formally and then introduce the languages
we will study. After reviewing several intertranslatability
results for these languages, we stepwise obtain the results
that lead to the expressiveness hierarchy. We conclude with
a discussion of avenues for future work.
Background
We assume given a finite set A of atoms (statements, argu-
ments), the vocabulary. A knowledge representation lan-
guage interpreted over A is then some set L; a (two-valued)
semantics for L is a mapping σ : L→ 22A that assigns sets
of two-valued models to the language elements. (So A is
implicit in L.) Strictly speaking, a two-valued interpretation
is a mapping from the set of atoms into the two truth values
true and false, but for technical ease we represent two-valued
interpretations by the sets containing the atoms that are true.
For a language L, we denote the range of the semantics
σ by σ(L). Intuitively, σ(L) is the set of models that lan-
guage L can express, with any knowledge base over vocab-
ulary A whatsoever. For example, for L = PL propositional
logic and σ = mod the usual model semantics, we have
σ(PL) = 22
A
since obviously any set of models is realis-
able in propositional logic.1 This leads us to compare dif-
ferent pairs of languages and semantics with respect to the
semantics’ range of models. Our concept of “language” con-
centrates on semantics and decidedly remains abstract.
Definition 1. Let A be a finite vocabulary, L1, L2 be lan-
guages that are interpreted over A and σ1 : L1 → 22A and
σ2 : L2 → 22A be two-valued semantics. We define
Lσ11 ≤e Lσ22 iff σ1(L1) ⊆ σ2(L2)
Intuitively, language L2 under semantics σ2 is at least as
expressive as language L1 under semantics σ1, because all
models that L1 can express under σ1 are also contained in
those that L2 can produce under σ2. (If the semantics are
clear from the context we will omit them; this holds in par-
ticular for argumentation frameworks and propositional lo-
gic, where we only look at a single semantics.) As usual,
• L1 <e L2 iff L1 ≤e L2 and L2 6≤e L1;
• L1 ∼=e L2 iff L1 ≤e L2 and L2 ≤e L1.
The relation ≤e is reflexive and transitive by definition, but
not necessarily antisymmetric. That is, there might different
languages L1 6= L2 that are equally expressive: L1 ∼=e L2.
We next introduce the particular knowledge representa-
tion languages we study in this paper. All will make use of
a vocabulary A; the results of the paper are all considered
parametric in such a given vocabulary.
Logic Programs
For a vocabulary A define not A = {not a | a ∈ A} and
the set of literals over A as A± = A ∪ not A. A normal
logic program rule over A is then of the form a← B where
a ∈ A and B ⊆ A±. The rule can be read as logical con-
sequence, “a is true if all literals in B are true.” The set B
1For a set X ⊆ 2A we can simply define ϕX = ∨M∈X ϕM
with ϕM =
∧
a∈M a ∧
∧
a∈A\M ¬a and clearly mod(ϕX) = X .
is called the body of the rule, we denote by B+ = B ∩A
and B− = {a ∈ A | not a ∈ B} the positive and negative
body atoms, respectively. A rule is definite if B− = ∅. For
singletonB = {b}we denote the rule just by a← b. A logic
program (LP) P over A is a set of logic program rules over
A, and it is definite if all rules in it are definite.
At first, logic programs were restricted to definite pro-
grams, whose semantics was defined through the proof-
theoretic procedure of SLD resolution. The meaning of
negation not was only defined operationally through neg-
ation as failure. Clark (1978) gave the first declarative
semantics for normal logic programs via a translation to
classical logic that will be recalled shortly. This leads to
the supported model semantics for logic programs: A rule
a← B ∈ P is active in a set M ⊆ A iff B+ ⊆M and
B− ∩M = ∅ imply a ∈M . M is a supported model for
P iff M = {a ∈ A | a← B ∈ P is active in M}. For a lo-
gic program P we denote the set of its supported models by
su(P ). The intuition behind this semantics is that everything
that is true in a model has some kind of support.
However, this support might be cyclic self-support. For
instance, the logic program {a← a} has two supported
models, ∅ and {a}, where the latter is undesired in many ap-
plication domains. As an alternative, Gelfond and Lifschitz
(1988) proposed the stable model semantics, a declarative
semantics for negation as failure that does not allow self-
support: M ⊆ A is a stable model for P iff M is the⊆-least
supported model of PM , where the definite program PM is
obtained from P by (1) eliminating each rule whose body
contains a literal not a with a ∈M , and (2) deleting all lit-
erals of the form not a from the bodies of the remaining
rules. We write st(P ) for the set of stable models of P . It
follows from the definition of stable models that st(P ) is a
⊆-antichain: for all M1 6= M2 ∈ st(P ) we have M1 6⊆M2.
Argumentation Frameworks
Dung (1995) introduced argumentation frameworks as pairs
F = (A,R) whereA is a set andR ⊆ A×A a relation. The
intended reading of an AF F is that the elements of A are
arguments whose internal structure is abstracted away. The
only information about the arguments is given by the relation
R encoding a notion of attack: a pair (a, b) ∈ R expresses
that argument a attacks argument b in some sense.
The purpose of semantics for argumentation frameworks
is to determine sets of arguments (called extensions) which
are acceptable according to various standards. For a given
extension S ⊆ A, the arguments in S are considered to be
accepted, those that are attacked by some argument in S are
considered to be rejected, and all others are neither, their
status is undecided. We will only be interested in so-called
stable extensions, sets S of arguments that do not attack each
other and attack all arguments not in the set. For stable ex-
tensions, each argument is either accepted or rejected by
definition, thus the semantics is two-valued. More form-
ally, a set S ⊆ A of arguments is conflict-free iff there are
no a, b ∈ S with (a, b) ∈ R. A set S is a stable extension
for (A,R) iff it is conflict-free and for all a ∈ A \ S there
is a b ∈ S with (b, a) ∈ R. For an AF F , we denote the set
of its stable extensions by st(F ). Again, it follows from the
definition of a stable extension that the set st(F ) is always a
⊆-antichain.
Abstract Dialectical Frameworks
An abstract dialectical framework (ADF) is a directed graph
whose nodes represent statements or positions which can be
accepted or not. The links represent dependencies: the status
of a node a only depends on the status of its parents (denoted
par(a)), that is, the nodes with a direct link to a. In addition,
each node a has an associated acceptance condition Ca spe-
cifying the exact conditions under which a is accepted. Ca
is a function assigning to each subset of par(a) one of the
truth values t or f . Intuitively, if for some R ⊆ par(a) we
have Ca(R) = t, then a will be accepted provided the nodes
in R are accepted and those in par(a) \R are not accepted.
More formally, an abstract dialectical framework is a
tuple D = (A,L,C) where
• A is a set of statements,
• L ⊆ A×A is a set of links,
• C = {Ca}a∈A is a collection of total functions
Ca : 2
par(a) → {t, f}, one for each statement a.
The function Ca is called acceptance condition of a.
It is often convenient to represent acceptance conditions by
propositional formulas. In particular, we will do so for sev-
eral results of this paper. There, each Ca is represented
by a propositional formula ϕa over par(a). Then, clearly,
Ca(R ∩ par(a)) = t iff R is a model for ϕa, R |= ϕa.
Brewka and Woltran (2010) introduced a useful subclass
of ADFs: an ADF D = (A,L,C) is bipolar iff all links in
L are supporting or attacking (or both). A link (b, a) ∈ L
is supporting in D iff for all R ⊆ par(a), we have that
Ca(R) = t impliesCa(R ∪ {b}) = t. Symmetrically, a link
(b, a) ∈ L is attacking in D iff for all R ⊆ par(a), we have
that Ca(R ∪ {b}) = t implies Ca(R) = t. If a link (b, a) is
both supporting and attacking then b has no influence on a,
the link is redundant (but does not violate bipolarity). We
will sometimes use this circumstance when searching for
ADFs; there we simply assume that L = A×A, then links
that are actually not needed can be expressed by acceptance
conditions that make them redundant.
There are numerous semantics for ADFs; we will only
be interested in two of them, (supported) models and stable
models. A set M ⊆ A is a model of D iff for all a ∈ A
we find that a ∈M iff Ca(M) = t. The definition of stable
models is inspired by logic programming and slightly more
complicated (Brewka et al., 2013). Define an operator by
ΓD(Q,R) = (acc(Q,R), rej (Q,R)) for Q,R ⊆ A, where
acc(Q,R) = {a ∈ A | for all Q ⊆ Z ⊆ (A \R),
we have Ca(Z) = t}
rej (Q,R) = {a ∈ A | for all Q ⊆ Z ⊆ (A \R),
we have Ca(Z) = f}
The intuition behind the operator is as follows: A pair
(Q,R) represents a partial interpretation of the set of state-
ments where those in Q are accepted (true), those in R
are rejected (false), and those in S \ (Q ∪ R) are neither.
The operator checks for each statement a whether all total
interpretations that can possibly arise from (Q,R) agree
on their truth value for the acceptance condition for a.
That is, if a has to be accepted no matter how the state-
ments in S \ (Q ∪R) are interpreted, then a ∈ acc(Q,R).
The set rej (Q,R) is computed symmetrically, so the pair
(acc(Q,R), rej (Q,R)) constitutes a refinement of (Q,R).
For M ⊆ A, the reduced ADF DM = (M,LM , CM ) is
defined by LM = L ∩M ×M and for each a ∈M setting
ϕMa = ϕa[b/f : b /∈M ], that is, replacing all b /∈M by false
in the acceptance formula of a. A modelM forD is a stable
model ofD iff the least fixpoint of the operator ΓDM is given
by (M, ∅). As usual, su(D) and st(D) denote the model sets
of the two semantics. While ADF models can be subsets of
one another, ADF stable models cannot.
Translations between the formalisms
From AFs to BADFs Brewka and Woltran (2010) showed
how to translate AFs into ADFs: For an AF F = (A,R),
define the ADF associated to F as D(F ) = (A,R,C) with
C = {ϕa}a∈A and ϕa =
∧
(b,a)∈R ¬b for a ∈ A. Clearly,
the resulting ADF is bipolar; parents are always attacking.
Brewka and Woltran (2010) proved that this translation is
faithful for the AF stable extension and ADF model se-
mantics (Proposition 1). Brewka et al. (2013) later proved
the same for the AF stable extension and ADF stable model
semantics (Theorem 4). It is easy to see that the translation
can be computed in polynomial time.
From ADFs to PL Brewka and Woltran (2010) also
showed that ADFs under supported model semantics can
be faithfully translated into propositional logic: When ac-
ceptance conditions of statements a ∈ A are represented by
propositional formulas ϕa, then the supported models of an
ADF D over A are given by the classical models of the for-
mula set {a↔ ϕa | a ∈ A}.
From AFs to PL In combination, the previous two trans-
lations yield a polynomial and faithful translation chain from
AFs into propositional logic.
From ADFs to LPs In recent work we showed that
ADFs can be faithfully translated into normal logic pro-
grams (Strass, 2013). For an ADF D = (A,L,C), its stand-
ard logic program P (D) is given by
{a← (M ∪ not (par(a) \M)) | a ∈ A,Ca(M) = t}
It is an easy consequence of Lemma 3.14 in (Strass, 2013)
that this translation preserves the supported model se-
mantics. For complexity reasons, we cannot expect that this
translation is also faithful for the stable semantics. And in-
deed, the ADF D = ({a} , {(a, a)} , {ϕa = a ∨ ¬a}) has a
stable model {a} while its standard logic program P (D) =
{a← a, a← not a} has no stable model.
From AFs to LPs The translation chain from AFs to
ADFs to LPs is compact, and faithful for AF stable se-
mantics and LP stable semantics (Osorio et al., 2005), and
AF stable semantics and LP supported semantics (Strass,
2013).
From LPs to PL It is well-known that normal logic
programs under supported model semantics can be trans-
lated to propositional logic (Clark, 1978). There, a lo-
gic program P is translated to a propositional theory
ΦP = {a↔ ϕa | a ∈ A} where
ϕa =
∨
a←B∈P
( ∧
b∈B+
b ∧
∧
b∈B−
¬b
)
for a ∈ A. For the stable model semantics, additional for-
mulas have to be added, but the extended translation works
all the same (Lin and Zhao, 2004).
From LPs to ADFs The Clark completion of a normal
logic program directly yields an equivalent ADF over the
same signature (Brewka and Woltran, 2010). Clearly the
translation is computable in polynomial time and the blowup
(with respect to the original logic program) is at most lin-
ear. The resulting translation is faithful for the supported
model semantics, which is a straightforward consequence of
Lemma 3.16 in (Strass, 2013).
Relative Expressiveness
We now analyse and compare the relative expressiveness of
argumentation frameworks – AFs –, (bipolar) abstract dia-
lectical frameworks – (B)ADFs –, normal logic programs –
LPs – and propositional logic – PL. We first look at the dif-
ferent families of semantics – supported and stable models
– in isolation and afterwards combine the two. For the lan-
guages L ∈ {ADF,LP} that have both supported and stable
semantics, we will indicate the semantics σ via a superscript
as in Definition 1. For AFs we only consider the stable ex-
tension semantics, as this is (to date) the only two-valued
semantics for AFs. For propositional logic PL we consider
the usual model semantics.
With the syntactic translations we reviewed in the previ-
ous section, we currently have the following relationships.
For the supported semantics,
AF ≤e BADFsu ≤e ADFsu ∼=e LPsu ≤e PL
and for the stable semantics,
AF ≤e BADFst ≤e ADFst <e PL
AF ≤e LPst <e PL
Note that ADFst <e PL and LPst <e PL hold since sets
of stable models have an antichain property, in contrast to
model sets of propositional logic.
Supported semantics
As depicted above, we know that expressiveness from AFs
to propositional logic does not decrease. However, it is not
yet clear if any of the relationships is strict.
We first show that ADFs can realise any set of models.
To show this, we first make a case distinction whether the
desired-model set is empty. If there should be no model, we
construct an ADF without models. If the set of desired mod-
els is nonempty, we construct acceptance conditions directly
from the set of desired interpretations. The construction is
similar in design to the one we reviewed for propositional lo-
gic, but takes into account the additional interaction between
statements and their acceptance conditions.
Theorem 1. PL ≤e ADFsu
Proof. Consider a vocabularyA and a setX ⊆ 2A. We con-
struct an ADF DsuX with su(D
su
X ) = X as follows.
1. X = ∅. We choose some a ∈ A and set
DsuX = ({a} , {(a, a)} , {Ca}) with Ca(∅) = t and
Ca({a}) = f . It is easy to see that DsuX has no model.
2. X 6= ∅. Define DsuX = (A,L,C) where L = A×A and
for each a ∈ A and M ⊆ A, we set Ca(M) = t iff
(M ∈ X and a ∈M) or (M /∈ X and a /∈M)
We have to show that M ∈ X iff M is a model for DsuX .
“if”: Let M be a model of DsuX .
(a) M = ∅. Pick any a ∈ A. Since M is a model of
DsuX , we have Ca(M) = f . So either (A) M ∈ X and
a /∈M or (B) M /∈ X and a ∈M , by definition of
Ca. By assumption M = ∅, thus a /∈M and M ∈ X .
(b) M 6= ∅. Let a ∈M . Then Ca(M) = t since M is a
model of DsuX . By definition of Ca, M ∈ X .
“only if”: Let M ∈ X .
(a) M = ∅. Choose any a ∈ A. By assumption, a /∈M
andM ∈ X , whenceCa(M) = f by definition. Since
a ∈ A was chosen arbitrarily, we have Ca(M) = f iff
a /∈M . Thus M is a model of DsuX .
(b) M 6= ∅. Let a ∈ A. If a ∈M , then by assump-
tion and definition of Ca we have Ca(M) = t. Con-
versely, if a /∈M , then by definition Ca(M) = f .
Since a ∈ A was arbitrary, M is a model of DsuX . 
When the acceptance conditions are written as proposi-
tional formulas, the construction in Theorem 1 simply sets
ϕa =
∨
M∈X,a∈M
ϕM ∨
∨
M⊆A,M /∈X,a/∈M
ϕM
ϕM =
∧
a∈M
a ∧
∧
a∈A\M
¬a
Since ADFs under supported semantics can be faithfully
translated into logic programs, which can be likewise further
translated to propositional logic, we have the following.
Corollary 2. ADFsu ∼=e LPsu ∼=e PL
While general ADFs under the supported model se-
mantics can realise any set of models, the subclass of bipolar
ADFs turns out to be less expressive. This is shown using
the next result, which allows us to decide realisability of a
given model set X ⊆ 2A in non-deterministic polynomial
time. We assume that the size of the input is in the order of∣∣2A∣∣, that is, the input set X is represented directly. The de-
cision procedure then basically uses the construction of The-
orem 1 and an additional encoding of bipolarity to define a
reduction to the satisfiability problem in propositional logic.
Theorem 3. Let X ⊆ 2A be a set of sets. It is decidable
in non-deterministic polynomial time whether there exists a
bipolar ADF D with su(D) = X .
Proof. We construct a propositional formula φX that is sat-
isfiable if and only if X is bipolarly realisable. The proposi-
tional signature we use is the following: For each a ∈ A and
M ⊆ A, there is a propositional variable pMa that expresses
whether Ca(M) = t. This allows to encode all possible ac-
ceptance conditions for the statements in A. To enforce bi-
polarity, we use additional variables to model supporting and
attacking links: for all a, b ∈ A, there is a variable pa,bsup say-
ing that a supports b, and a variable pa,batt saying that a attacks
b. So the vocabulary of φX is given by
P =
{
pMa , p
a,b
sup , p
a,b
att
∣∣∣M ⊆ A, a ∈ A, b ∈ A}
To guarantee the desired set of models, we constrain the ac-
ceptance conditions as dictated by X: For any desired set
M and statement a, the containment of a in M must corres-
pond exactly to whether Ca(M) = t; this is encoded in φ∈X .
Conversely, for any undesired set M and statement a, there
must not be any such correspondence, which φ/∈X expresses.
φ∈X =
∧
M∈X
 ∧
a∈M
pMa ∧
∧
a∈A\M
¬pMa

φ/∈X =
∧
M⊆A,M /∈X
 ∨
a∈M
¬pMa ∨
∨
a∈A\M
pMa

To enforce bipolarity, we state that each link must be sup-
porting or attacking. To model the meaning of support and
attack, we encode all ground instances of their definitions.
φbipolar =
∧
a,b∈A
((
pa,bsup ∨ pa,batt
)
∧ φa,bsup ∧ φa,batt
)
φa,bsup = p
a,b
sup →
∧
M⊆A
(
pMb → pM∪{a}b
)
φa,batt = p
a,b
att →
∧
M⊆A
(
p
M∪{a}
b → pMb
)
The overall formula is given by φX = φ∈X ∧ φ/∈X ∧ φbipolar .
The rest of the proof – showing thatX is bipolarly realisable
if and only if φX is satisfiable – is delegated to Lemma 12
in the Appendix. 
Remarkably, the decision procedure does not only give an
answer, but in the case of a positive answer we can read off
the BADF realisation from the satisfying evaluation of the
constructed formula. We illustrate the construction with an
example that will subsequently be used to show that general
ADFs are strictly more expressive than bipolar ADFs.
Example 1. Consider A = {x, y, z} and this model set:
X1 = {∅, {x, y} , {x, z} , {y, z}}
The construction of Theorem 3 yields these formulas:
φ∈X1 = ¬p∅x ∧ ¬p∅y ∧ ¬p∅z ∧
p{x,y}x ∧ p{x,y}y ∧ ¬p{x,y}z ∧
p{x,z}x ∧ ¬p{x,z}y ∧ p{x,z}z ∧
¬p{y,z}x ∧ p{y,z}y ∧ p{y,z}z
φ/∈X1 = (¬p{x}x ∨ p{x}y ∨ p{x}z ) ∧
(p{y}x ∨ ¬p{y}y ∨ p{y}z ) ∧
(p{z}x ∨ p{z}y ∨ ¬p{z}z ) ∧
(¬p{x,y,z}x ∨ ¬p{x,y,z}y ∨ ¬p{x,y,z}z )
The remaining formulas about bipolarity are independent of
X1, we do not show them here. We have implemented the
translation of Theorem 3 and used the solver clasp (Gebser
et al., 2011) to verify that φX1 is unsatisfiable.
A manual proof of bipolar non-realisability of X1 seems
to amount to a laborious case distinction that explores the
mutual incompatibility of the disjunctions in φ/∈X1 and bi-
polarity, a task that is better left to machines. Together with
the straightforward statement of fact that X1 can be realised
by a non-bipolar ADF, the example leads to the next result.
Theorem 4. BADFsu <e ADFsu
Proof. The model set from Example 1 is realisable under
model semantics by ADF DX1 with acceptance conditions
ϕx = (y = z), ϕy = (x= z), ϕz = (x= y)
where “=” denotes exclusive disjunction XOR. However,
there is no bipolar ADF realising the model set X1, as is
witnessed by unsatisfiability of φX1 and Theorem 3. 
Clearly ADF DX1 is not bipolar since in all acceptance for-
mulas, all statements are neither supporting nor attacking. It
is not the only realisation, some alternatives are given by
D′X1 : ϕx = (y = z), ϕy = y, ϕz = z
D′′X1 : ϕx = x, ϕy = (x= z), ϕz = z
D′′′X1 : ϕx = x, ϕy = y, ϕz = (x= y)
This shows that we cannot necessarily use the model set X1
to determine a single reason for bipolar non-realisability,
that is, a single link (b, a) that is neither supporting nor
attacking in all realisations. Rather, the culprit(s) might
be different in each realisation, and to show bipolar non-
realisability, we have to prove that for all realisations, there
necessarily exists some reason for non-bipolarity. And the
number of different ADF realisations of a given model set
X can be considerable, as our next result shows.
Proposition 5. Let |A| = n, X ⊆ 2A with ∣∣2A \X∣∣ = m.
The number of distinct ADFs D with su(D) = X is
r(n,m) = (2n − 1)m
Proof. We have to count the number of distinct models of
the formula φ′X = φ
∈
X ∧ φ/∈X from the proof of Theorem 3.
We first observe that for each a ∈ A and M ⊆ A, the pro-
positional variable pMa occurs exactly once in φ
′
X . For-
mula φ∈X is a conjunction of literals and does not contribute
to combinatorial explosion. Formula φ/∈X contains m con-
juncts. Each of the conjuncts is a disjunction of n distinct
literals. There are 2n − 1 ways to satisfy such a disjunction.
The claim now follows since for each of m conjuncts, we
can choose one of 2n − 1 different ways to satisfy it. 
So the main contributing factor is the number m
of interpretations that are excluded from the desired
model set X . For Example 1, for instance, there are
(23 − 1)4 = 74 = 2401 ADFs with the model set X1. Ac-
cording to Theorem 4, none of them is bipolar. Obviously,
the maximal number of realisations is achieved by X = ∅
whence r(n, 2n) = (2n − 1)2n . On the other hand, the
model set X = 2A has exactly one realisation, r(n, 0) = 1.
It is comparably easy to show that BADF models are
strictly more expressive than AFs, since sets of supported
models of bipolar ADFs do not have the antichain property.
Proposition 6. AF <e BADFsu
Proof. Consider the vocabulary A = {a} and the BADF
D = (A, {(a, a)} , {ϕa}) with ϕa = a. It is straightforward
to check that its model set is su(D) = {∅, {a}}. Since
model sets of AFs under stable extension semantics satisfy
the antichain property, there is no equivalent AF over A. 
This yields the following overall relationships:
AF <e BADFsu <e ADFsu ∼=e LPsu ∼=e PL
Stable semantics
As before, we recall the current state of knowledge:
AF ≤e BADFst ≤e ADFst <e PL and AF ≤e LPst <e PL
We first show that BADFs are strictly more expressive
than AFs.
Proposition 7. AF <e BADFst
Proof. Consider the BADF from Proposition 6, where the
acceptance formula of the single statement a is given by
ϕa = a. Its only stable model is ∅. However there is no
AF with a single argument with the same set of stable exten-
sions: the only candidates are ({a} , ∅) and ({a} , {(a, a)});
their respective stable-extension sets are {{a}} and ∅. 
Even if we discount for this special case of realising the
empty stable extension, there are non-trivial extension-sets
that AFs cannot realise.
Example 2 ((Dunne et al., 2014)). Consider the model set
X2 = {{x, y} , {x, z} , {y, z}}. Dunne et al. (2014) proved
that X2 is not realisable with stable AF semantics. Intuit-
ively, the argument is as follows: Since x and y occur in
an extension together, there can be no attack between them.
The same holds for the pairs x, z and y, z. But then the set
{x, y, z} is conflict-free and thus there must be a stable ex-
tension containing all three arguments, which is not allowed
by X2. The reason is AFs’ restriction to individual attack,
as set attack (also called joint or collective attack) suffices to
realise X2 with BADF D under stable model semantics:
ϕx = ¬y ∨ ¬z, ϕy = ¬x ∨ ¬z, ϕz = ¬x ∨ ¬y
Let us exemplarily show that M = {x, y} is a stable
model (the other cases are completely symmetric): The re-
duct DM is characterised by the two acceptance formulas
ϕx = ¬y ∨ ¬f and ϕy = ¬x ∨ ¬f . We then easily find that
ΓDM (∅, ∅) = (M, ∅) = ΓDM (M, ∅).
The construction from the previous example model set
comes from logic programming (Eiter et al., 2013) and can
be generalised to realise any non-empty model set satisfying
the antichain property.
Definition 2. Let X ⊆ 2A. Define the following BADF
DstX = (A,L,C) where Ca for a ∈ A is given by
ϕa =
∨
M∈X,a∈M
 ∧
b∈A\M
¬b

and thus L = {(b, a) |M ∈ X, a ∈M, b ∈ A \M}.
We next show that the construction indeed works.
Theorem 8. LetX with ∅ 6= X ⊆ 2A be a⊆-antichain. We
find that st(DstX) = X .
Proof. Let M ⊆ A.
“⊆”: Let M /∈ X . We show that M /∈ su(DstX) ⊇ st(DstX).
1. There is an N ∈ X with M ( N . Then there is
an a ∈ N \M . Consider its acceptance formula
ϕa. Since a ∈ N and N ∈ X , the formula ϕa has
a disjunct ψa,N =
∧
b∈A\N ¬b. Now M ⊆ N im-
plies A \N ⊆ A \M and M is a model for ψa,N .
Thus M is a model for ϕa although a /∈M , hence
M /∈ su(DstX).
2. For all N ∈ X , we have M 6⊆ N . Obviously M 6= ∅
since X 6= ∅. Let a ∈M . For each N ∈ X with
a ∈ N , the acceptance formula ϕa contains a disjunct
ψa,N =
∧
b∈A\N ¬b. By assumption, for each N ∈ X
there is a bN ∈M \N . Clearly bN ∈ A \N and bN is
evaluated to true by M . Hence for each N ∈ X with
a ∈ N , the disjunct ψa,N is evaluated to false by M .
Thus ϕa is false under M and M /∈ su(DstX).
“⊇”: Let M ∈ X . We first show that M is a model of DstX ,
that is: for all a ∈ A, a ∈M iff M is a model for ϕa.
1. Let a ∈M . By construction, we have that ϕa in DstX
contains a disjunct of the form ψa,M =
∧
b∈A\M ¬b.
According to the interpretation M , all such b ∈ A \M
are false and thus ψa,M is true whence ϕa is true.
2. Let a ∈ A \M and consider its acceptance formula
ϕa. Assume to the contrary that M is a model for
ϕa. Then there is some N ∈ X with a ∈ N such
that M is a model for ψa,N =
∧
b∈A\N ¬b, that is,
A \N ⊆ A \M . Hence M ⊆ N and X is not a ⊆-
antichain. Contradiction. Thus M is no model for ϕa.
Now consider the reduct DM of DstX with re-
spect to M . There, ϕMa contains the disjunct
ψMa,M = ψa,M [b/f : b /∈M ] where all b ∈ A \M have
been replaced by false, whence ψMa,M = ¬f ∧ . . . ∧ ¬f
and ϕMa is equivalent to true. Thus each a ∈M is true
in the least fixpoint of ΓDM and thus M ∈ st(DstX). 
The restriction to non-empty model sets is immaterial, since
we can use the construction of Theorem 1 to realise the
empty model set.
Since the stable model semantics for both ADFs and nor-
mal logic programs have the antichain property, the follow-
ing is clear.
Corollary 9. ADFst ≤e BADFst and LPst ≤e BADFst
For the family of stable semantics, this leads to the fol-
lowing overall expressiveness relationships:
AF <e BADFst ∼=e ADFst ∼=e LPst <e PL
Supported vs. stable semantics
Now we put the supported and stable pictures together. From
the proof of Theorem 8, we can read off that for the canon-
ical realisation DstX of an antichain X , the supported and
stable semantics coincide, that is, su(DstX) = st(D
st
X) = X .
With this observation, also bipolar ADFs under the suppor-
ted semantics can realise any antichain, and we have this:
Proposition 10. BADFst ≤e BADFsu
As we have seen in Proposition 6, there are bipolar ADFs
with supported-model sets that are not antichains. Thus we
get the following result.
Corollary 11. BADFst <e BADFsu
This result allows us to close the last gap and put together
the big picture in Figure 1 below.
AF
BADFst ∼=e ADFst ∼=e LPst
BADFsu
ADFsu ∼=e LPsu ∼=e PL
Figure 1: The expressiveness hierarchy. Expressiveness
strictly increases from bottom to top. Lσ denotes lan-
guage L under semantics σ, where “su” is the supported
and “st” the stable model semantics; languages are among
AFs (argumentation frameworks), ADFs (abstract dialect-
ical frameworks), BADFs (bipolar ADFs), LPs (normal lo-
gic programs) and PL (propositional logic).
Discussion
We compared the expressiveness of abstract argumentation
frameworks, abstract dialectical frameworks, normal logic
programs and propositional logic. We showed that express-
iveness under different semantics varies for the formalisms
and obtained a neat expressiveness hierarchy. These results
inform us about the capabilities of these languages to encode
sets of two-valued interpretations, and help us decide which
languages to use for specific applications.
For instance, if we wish to encode arbitrary model sets,
for example when using model-based revision, then ADFs
and logic programs under supported semantics are a good
choice. If we are happy with the restricted class of model
sets having the antichain property, then we would be ill-
advised to use general ADFs under stable model semantics
with their ΣP2 -hard stable model existence problem; to real-
ise an antichain, it suffices to use bipolar ADFs or normal
logic programs, where stable model existence is in NP.
There is much potential for further work. First of all, for
results on non-realisability, it would be better to have neces-
sary conditions than having to use a non-deterministic de-
cision procedure. For this, we need to obtain general criteria
that all model sets of a given formalism must obey, given
the formalism is not universally expressive. This is non-
trivial in general, and for AFs it constitutes a major open
problem (Dunne et al., 2014; Baumann et al., 2014). Like-
wise, we sometimes used semantical realisations instead of
syntactic ones; for example, to show universal realisabil-
ity of ADFs under supported models we started out with
model sets. It is an interesting question whether a real-
ising ADF can be constructed from a given propositional
formula without computing the models of the formula first.
Second, there are further semantics for abstract dialectical
frameworks whose expressiveness could be studied; Dunne
et al. (2014) already analyse many of them for argument-
ation frameworks. This work is thus only a start and the
same can be done for the remaining semantics, for example
admissible, complete, preferred and others, which are all
defined for AFs, (B)ADFs and LPs (Strass, 2013; Brewka
et al., 2013). Third, there are further formalisms in abstract
argumentation (Brewka, Polberg, and Woltran, 2013) whose
expressiveness is by and large unexplored to the best of our
knowledge. Fourth, the requirement that realisations may
only use a fixed vocabulary without any additional symbols
is quite restrictive. Intuitively, it should be allowed to add a
reasonable number of additional atoms, for example a con-
stant number or one that is linear in the original vocabulary.
Finally, our study only considered if a language can express
a model set, but not to what cost in terms of representation
size. So the natural next step is to consider the succinctness
of formalisms, “How large is the smallest knowledge base
expressing a given model set?” (Gogic et al., 1995). A land-
mark result in this direction has been obtained by Lifschitz
and Razborov (2006), who have shown that logic programs
(with respect to two-valued stable models) are exponentially
more succinct than propositional logic. That is, there are
logic programs whose respective sets of stable models can-
not be expressed by a propositional formula whose size is at
most polynomial in the size of the logic program, unless a
certain widely believed assumption of complexity theory is
false. With the results of the present paper, we have laid the
groundwork for a similar analysis of the other knowledge
representation languages considered here, perhaps working
towards a “map” of these languages in the sense of Darwiche
and Marquis’ knowledge compilation map [2002].
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Appendix
Lemma 12. X is bipolarly realisable if and only if the for-
mula φX from Theorem 3 is satisfiable.
Proof. “if”: Let I ⊆ P be a model for φX . For each
a ∈ A, we define an acceptance condition as follows:
for M ⊆ A, set Ca(M) = t iff pMa ∈ I . It is easy to
see that φbipolar guarantees that these acceptance con-
ditions are all bipolar. The ADF is now given by
DsuX = (A,A×A,C). It remains to show that any
M ⊆ A is a model of DsuX if and only if M ∈ X .
“if”: Let M ∈ X . We have to show that M is a model of
DsuX . Consider any a ∈ A.
1. a ∈M . Since I is a model of φ∈X , we have pMa ∈ I
and thus by definition Ca(M) = t.
2. a ∈ A \M . Since I is a model of φ∈X , we have
pMa /∈ I and thus by definition Ca(M) = f .
“only if”: LetM /∈ X . Since I is a model of φ/∈X , there is
an a ∈M such that Ca(M) = f or an a /∈M such that
Ca(M) = t. In any case, M is not a model of DsuX .
“only if”: Let D be a bipolar ADF with su(D) = X . We
use D to define a model I for φX . First, for M ⊆ A and
a ∈ A, set pMa ∈ I iff Ca(M) = t. Since D is bipolar,
each link is supporting or attacking and for all a, b ∈ A
we can find a valuation for pa,bsup and p
a,b
att . It remains to
show that I is a model for φX .
1. I is a model for φ∈X : Since D realises X , each M ∈ X
is a model of D and thus for all a ∈ A we have
Ca(M) = t iff a ∈M .
2. I is a model for φ/∈X : Since D realises X , each M ⊆ A
with M /∈ X is not a model of D. Thus for each such
M , there is an a ∈ A witnessing that M is not a model
of D: (1) a ∈M and Ca(M) = f , or (2) a /∈M and
Ca(M) = t.
3. I is a model for φbipolar : This is straightforward since
D is bipolar by assumption. 
